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3PART ONE: THE PRESENT
BUMPS IN THE SECESSION ROAD
On 10 November 2015, after months of veiled threats, 
Prime Minister David Cameron wrote a letter to Donald 
Tusk, President of the European Council, demanding 
a renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s membership 
of the European Union.1 Four years on and three prime 
ministers later, we may be about to see the denouement 
of Brexit.  
Against the sceptics and cynics,  
Mr Johnson continues to argue that  
he is trying for a deal.
Nothing is yet certain, and there will be many more 
surprises – “bumps in the road”, as Boris Johnson calls 
them – before the UK’s relationship with the EU is 
stabilised. But if the prime minister is to be believed 
(and why not?) the UK will secede from the EU at 
midnight on 31 October – deal or no deal.2
Against the sceptics and cynics, Mr Johnson continues 
to argue that he is trying for a deal. He has good reason 
to do so. He knows, like we do, that Brexit without a 
deal would be very harmful for the British economy 
and society. The threat of no deal has split his own 
party, perhaps irrevocably. The prime minister has lost 
the slender parliamentary majority he inherited from 
Theresa May. Cabinet responsibility, which is one of 
the core disciplines of Britain’s famously unwritten 
constitution, has disintegrated. Civic disorder is rising. 
The devolution arrangements in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland are creaking under pressure. The 
courts, including the UK Supreme Court, have had to 
intervene on the matter of parliamentary prerogative 
versus executive power. The government’s decision to 
prorogue Parliament on 9 September until 14 October 
has dragged the Queen into the constitutional furore. 
THERE CAN STILL BE A DEAL
To add insult to his injury, the prime minister finds 
himself trammelled by the cleverly crafted terms of the 
EU Withdrawal (No. 2) Act 2019, promoted by Labour’s 
Hilary Benn MP with the support of pro-European Tory 
rebels. The new law instructs Mr Johnson to write to Mr 
Tusk by 19 October requesting an extension of Article 50 
until 31 January 2020 if either no deal has been reached 
by then, or if there has been no agreement by then fixing 
a date for a no deal exit. 
The Act says that the purpose of the extension is “in 
order to debate and pass a Bill to implement” the 
Withdrawal Agreement, “including provisions reflecting 
the outcome of inter-party talks as announced by the 
Prime Minister on 21 May 2019, and in particular the 
need for the UK to secure changes to the political 
declaration to reflect the outcome of those interparty 
talks”. That last clause was tabled by Stephen Kinnock 
MP, a leading Labour figure on the side of compromise. 
Significantly, the amendment was accepted by the 
government without a vote. 
In the speech referred to, Mrs May offered a ‘New 
Brexit Deal’ with a ten-point plan, to be guaranteed by 
law, some of which merely concerned parliamentary 
procedures at Westminster, along with the promise of 
a Commons’ vote on holding a second referendum. The 
sticking point at the cross-party talks concerned the 
degree to which the UK would continue to align itself 
with the EU customs union. Mrs May offered Labour a 
compromise option of a temporary customs union on 
goods only, including seeking a UK say in relevant EU 
trade policy. Effectively, this meant that it would be 
up to the next government, after the May 2022 general 
election, to decide on the final direction of UK policy. 
Her ten concessions were Mrs May’s last roll of the dice. 
After a brutal reception in the Commons and a cabinet 
resignation on 22 May, and the results of the European 
Parliamentary elections on 23rd, the prime minister 
resigned on 24th. 
It is nevertheless significant that Boris Johnson has 
tacitly agreed to resurrect the May package. He has more 
flexibility than his predecessor for two reasons. Having 
lost his Commons majority he is no longer dependent 
on the votes of the ten DUP MPs who oppose a Northern 
Ireland-only deal. Few English nationalists make 
Ireland, North or South, their priority. And the hard-
right Brexiteers know that if Mr Johnson does not deliver 
Brexit, nobody else will: he is their last chance.  
The very great advantage that a deal  
brings over no deal is the gift of the 
transition period.
A revised Irish backstop that left Northern Ireland fully 
aligned with the Republic for trade in farm produce 
– which is, in any case, the preferred option of the 
European Commission – is unlikely to be blocked in 
the House of Commons. The EU has already committed 
itself to helping the UK and Ireland discover ‘alternative 
arrangements’ that would minimise the need for border 
4checks. It should be possible to specify more exactly 
what ‘no hard border’ really means in terms of trade in 
essential goods and services. Other clarifications could 
be made to bring the governance of the post-Brexit 
settlement more explicitly in line with the North-South 
institutional machinery established under the Good 
Friday Agreement, which might include a bigger role for 
the Stormont executive and assembly in determining 
the future of the province. Stormont could even be given 
a guaranteed place on the Joint Committee that is to 
manage the Withdrawal Agreement. 
If Mr Johnson delivers the concessions in the Kinnock 
package guaranteeing no regression by the UK from 
the highest EU social and environmental standards, he 
will gain support at Westminster from the moderate 
majority. He could even risk a Commons’ vote on 
a second referendum, as did Mrs May, in the safe 
knowledge that it would not pass. 
The very great advantage that a deal brings over no deal 
is the gift of the transition period, designed under the 
terms of the Withdrawal Agreement to avoid disruption 
and keep supply lines open. The transition period is 
due to expire in December 2020, but can be extended 
by one or two years.3 Even that, however, may not give 
enough time to conclude the final treaty with the UK. 
So Mr Johnson would be wise to ask for a new protocol 
to be added to the Withdrawal Agreement that would 
allow the transition period to be further extended, if 
necessary, to elide with the entry into force of whatever 
the final treaty between the EU and the UK will be.  
Apart from other advantages, such a flexible extension 
to the transition would obviate the need to deploy the 
Irish backstop. 
In these circumstances, it would seem 
best to jettison the Political Declaration 
entirely, and invite the Commons to vote 
only on the Withdrawal Agreement.
GOODBYE TO THE POLITICAL DECLARATION
There remains the problem of the Political Declaration. 
The EU has long said that it would be happy to revise 
the Declaration in the direction of closer regulatory 
alignment, even to embrace a new customs union with 
the UK. But Boris Johnson aims in a different direction, 
questioning commitments made by Theresa May to 
keep the level playing field. His new team of unschooled 
negotiators risks shoving the Brexit talks into reverse. 
Questions thought to be settled under Mrs May, like 
the role of the European Court of Justice and security 
guarantees, are being opened up again by the Johnson 
team. Neither side dares put a text of a new Declaration 
on the table. What used to be seen as an aid to building 
consensus about the Withdrawal Agreement now turns 
out to be an obstacle. 
It remains the case that the best way  
to avoid no deal is to do a deal. As 
successive votes have shown, there is  
no obvious Commons’ majority for 
any other option – including a second 
referendum, revocation of Article 50  
or a snap general election.
In these circumstances, it would seem best to jettison 
the Political Declaration entirely, and invite the 
Commons to vote only on the Withdrawal Agreement. 
An exchange of letters setting out the modalities of the 
future talks, with scope and timetable, should suffice 
to fulfil the Article 50 requirement to take into account 
the framework for the future relationship. In truth, 
nothing substantive can be agreed on customs outside 
the negotiations of the future free trade agreement. 
Only the nitty-gritty of a trade negotiation undertaken 
during a necessarily lengthy transition period will settle 
the issues of customs and tariffs and determine how 
frictionless future trade will be. 
A deal on these lines is possible before the end of 
October. It remains the case that the best way to avoid 
no deal is to do a deal. As successive votes have shown, 
there is no obvious Commons’ majority for any other 
option – including a second referendum, revocation of 
Article 50 or a snap general election. 
If the deal on such a basis can be done at the European 
Council on 17-18 October, the House of Commons will 
have to deliver its positive ‘meaningful vote’ (as it is 
bound to do under the terms of the EU Withdrawal 
Act 2018) in double-quick time, so that the European 
Parliament can then ratify the package.4 Thereafter, once 
the deal is done, both Houses of the British Parliament 
will need to enact the much-anticipated Withdrawal 
Agreement Bill, which should be the priority item of the 
Queen’s Speech on 14 October. In those circumstances,  
a short extension of Article 50 beyond 31 October into 
the first weeks of November would be inevitable to  
allow for the final legal acts to be taken properly on  
both sides. With Brexit done, a general election could 
then be anticipated. 
YET ANOTHER EXTENSION?
On the other hand, should no deal emerge from the late 
flurry of talks, the October European Council will be 
faced with a flailing British prime minister forced under 
duress by his Parliament to seek an extension to Article 
50. How should the heads of government then react? 
5When confronted by the UK’s previous request to 
extend the timetable, the leaders needed eight hours 
of discussion in order to agree, by unanimity, that they 
would agree to an extension “to allow for the ratification 
of the Withdrawal Agreement … Such an extension 
should last only as long as necessary and, in any event, 
no longer than 31 October”.5 A similar debate in October 
promises to be even more fraught.6 Nothing can be 
presumed. The EU is in a better state of preparedness for 
a no deal Brexit than is the UK.7 
Repeated extensions of Article 50 look 
weak. Endless prevarication over Brexit 
is damaging the morale, reputation and 
efficiency of the European Union.
The European Council will only be minded to grant a 
third extension if convinced there is a serious purpose 
behind the request. A general election may or may 
not be a serious reason for delaying Brexit: the fear is 
that an election will not clarify what the UK wants as 
both the Tory and Labour parties will remain deeply 
divided about Brexit during and after the campaign. 
The heads of government would be bound to try to set 
stricter conditions than they did in March, and fix a 
firm deadline for the termination of Article 50 that best 
suited the EU’s needs (which is not 31 January 2020).8 
While it is true that none of the EU leaders want to be 
seen to be bullying the British people, in recent weeks 
the mood has turned against the British government. 
Repeated extensions of Article 50 look weak. Endless 
prevarication over Brexit is damaging the morale, 
reputation and efficiency of the European Union. If Boris 
Johnson were to reject the EU’s offer of a revised deal, he 
could expect no more favours from Brussels. 
When they come to bring closure to Brexit (one way or 
the other), the EU institutions and its member states 
would do well to reflect on how they have managed the 
secession process so far. What lessons can be learned? 
A preliminary assessment of how the EU has played its 
Brexit cards will be useful in guiding future strategic 
decisions. Even in the short term, no matter what 
happens on 1 November, talks between the UK and the 
EU will have to start up again immediately, revisiting 
familiar territory but on a different legal basis. Brussels 
needs to be ready for the next episode in the drama of 
Britain’s relations with Europe, and it can learn much 
from having had the practical experience of Article 50. 
PART TWO: THE PAST
ARTICLE 50 REVISITED
Article 50 TEU, which governs how a state should  
leave the Union, was inserted into the Constitutional 
Treaty of 2004 with the support of both federalists  
(who want renegade states to leave the federal union) 
and nationalists (who want liberation from federal 
union). Whether or not the clause was ever intended 
to be used is academic: opinions in the Convention 
differed, and both Greece and Britain were floated as 
potential candidates. It was agreed that it was better 
to have a provision which provided for a voluntary 
democratic exit – with the implication that no state 
could or should ever be expelled from membership 
against its will. The Convention’s president, Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, proposed the two-year time limit  
in order to minimise collateral damage to those  
states remaining. 
From the outset it was clear that Article 50 was more 
about defending the interests of the EU than aiding  
and abetting the departing member state. It is wrong  
to draw too strict an analogy between Article 50 and 
Article 49 TEU, which regulates the accession of a new 
member state. The EU is committed in spirit and in  
law to widen its membership. It proselytises in the  
hope of recruiting more members. Article 49 establishes 
elaborate but systematic processes by which a candidate 
state is pulled towards and across the threshold  
of membership.  
It is not the fault of the EU, still less of 
the drafters of Article 50, that the UK 
transpired not to have the faintest idea 
what it wanted to do post-Brexit. But  
nor is it the job of the EU to rescue the  
UK from its own folly.
Not so Article 50, whereby the errant state is enjoined 
before leaving to agree to the terms of its withdrawal: if 
no agreement is reached, the EU treaties simply cease  
to apply to that state two years after it triggered the 
formal process. The main purpose of Article 50, then,  
is to allow the EU to cut its legal and political links, 
leaving the erstwhile partner to its own devices. 
Pointedly, Article 50(4) recalls that if a state which  
has withdrawn asks to rejoin, it must use the route 
provided by Article 49.9
6Implicit in the European Union’s Article 50 process is 
the assumption that the departing state knows why it 
is leaving and where it intends to end up having left. 
That is why Article 50(2) speaks of the need to settle the 
state’s withdrawal arrangements “taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union”. 
It is not the fault of the EU, still less of the drafters 
of Article 50, that the UK transpired not to have the 
faintest idea what it wanted to do post-Brexit. But nor is 
it the job of the EU to rescue the UK from its own folly. 
The EU did its best to accommodate the UK’s confusing 
and contradictory red lines without compromising 
its own core principles. Unlike enlargement, where 
the Commission actively encourages the candidate’s 
progress, the college has retained studious neutrality 
over Brexit. Its Task Force 50, led by Michel Barnier, 
focussed on accomplishing its mandate to reach a 
withdrawal agreement with the UK. It did not draft texts 
on behalf of the UK government even when it could 
easily – and helpfully – have done so. 
CAMERON’S LEGACY
The EU’s officially cool position was much influenced 
by its recent bad experience of coping with the British. 
Lessons were drawn from Mr Cameron’s damaging 
renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership in which 
the European Council under Donald Tusk conceded much 
of what he sought. The ‘New Settlement’ of February 2016 
was negotiated laboriously in a well-meaning but vain 
attempt to rescue the UK prime minister from the plight 
of his own making.10 Had the botched new arrangements 
ever entered into force, the UK as a disaffected and 
insincere member state would have been a continuing 
source of European disintegration. 
In particular, the concession to the UK of an opt-out 
from the historic mission of “ever closer union” was a 
gross error with potentially devastating consequences 
for future cohesion and solidarity. Thanks to Charles 
Michel, the Belgian prime minister, a late clause was 
added to the New Settlement that made the whole 
package deal null and void should the British people, in 
their wisdom, reject it. As they did. The constitutional 
integrity of the Union was at least preserved, and the 
prospect of rows with the European Parliament and 
litigation at the European Court of Justice over the 
implementation of the New Settlement was avoided. 
SECOND CHANCE
In one sense, therefore, the referendum decision of 23 
June 2016 gave the European Union a second chance to 
regather its troops and retrieve momentum. Evidence 
of the change of direction on behalf of the European 
Council came only a week later. The statement of 29 
June of the European Council minus Mr Cameron 
was made under the concertation of Jeppe Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, Secretary General of the Council. It 
established the ground rules for the deployment of 
Article 50: 
“There is a need to organise the withdrawal of 
the UK from the EU in an orderly fashion. Article 
50 TEU provides the legal basis for this process. 
It is up to the British government to notify 
the European Council of the UK’s intention 
to withdraw from the Union. This should be 
done as quickly as possible. There can be no 
negotiations of any kind before this notification 
has taken place.”
Note the introduction of the concept of orderliness, not 
found in Article 50 itself. 
“In the future, we hope to have the UK as a close 
partner of the EU and we look forward to the 
UK stating its intentions in this respect. Any 
agreement, which will be concluded with the UK as 
a third country, will have to be based on a balance 
of rights and obligations. Access to the Single 
Market requires acceptance of all four freedoms.”
The explicit insistence on balancing rights and 
obligations was novel, indicating to all concerned that 
the UK as a third country could not expect more rights 
than it had when a member state. Access to the internal 
market would depend on its ability to respect, and to be 
seen to respect, the level playing field.11 The assertion 
of the indivisibility of the four principles of freedom 
of movement was an elaboration of existing treaty 
provisions made in the knowledge that the UK wants to 
restrict immigration from the EU.12
GUIDELINES AND CORE PRINCIPLES
Backed by Parliament, Theresa May pulled the trigger 
of Article 50 on 29 March 2017.13 Again the EU moved 
quickly to instil discipline and direction into the Brexit 
business. The European Council published seminal 
guidelines on 24 April: 
“[T]he Union’s overall objective in these 
negotiations will be to preserve its interests, 
those of its citizens, its businesses and its 
Member States … With this in mind, we must 
proceed according to a phased approach giving 
priority to an orderly withdrawal … Throughout 
these negotiations the Union will maintain its 
unity and act as one with the aim of reaching a 
result that is fair and equitable for all Member 
States and in the interest of its citizens. It will 
be constructive and strive to find an agreement. 
This is in the best interest of both sides. The 
Union will work hard to achieve that outcome, 
but it will prepare itself to be able to handle the 
situation also if the negotiations were to fail.”14
Note the first explicit appearance of the concept of the 
EU’s own interests – a term not found in the treaties. 
Returning to their main theme, the European Council 
fired another warning shot across the bows of the British:
“It further reiterates that any agreement with 
the United Kingdom will have to be based on a 
7balance of rights and obligations, and ensure a 
level playing field. Preserving the integrity of 
the Single Market excludes participation based 
on a sector-by-sector approach. A non-member 
of the Union, that does not live up to the same 
obligations as a member, cannot have the same 
rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member. 
In this context, the European Council welcomes 
the recognition by the British Government 
that the four freedoms of the Single Market are 
indivisible and that there can be no “cherry-
picking”. The Union will preserve its autonomy 
as regards its decision-making as well as the role 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”15
These core principles would apply not only to the 
negotiation of an orderly withdrawal but also “to 
any preliminary and preparatory discussions on the 
framework for a future relationship, and to any form of 
transitional arrangements.” 
The hybrid nature of EU governance was 
established – Commission and Council 
working in tandem – but so also was  
the hierarchy between the EU institutions 
and national capitals. Brussels was in 
charge, and tightly organised.
Alongside what came to be the very familiar bogey 
of cherry-picking, came the idea of a time-limited 
transitional period. Again, transition periods are not 
to be found in Article 50 – although they have proven 
useful in smoothing the accession to the EU of new 
member states under Article 49.16 Finally, the UK was 
enjoined not to forget that while it remained a member 
state it remained subject to the treaty principle of 
sincere cooperation.17
The European Council decided to phase the talks with 
the British and to sequence their phasing when it was 
satisfied various conditions had been met: in other 
words, priority issues had to be resolved first before 
moving on to wider political discussions about the 
nature of the future relationship. Nothing would  
be agreed until everything was agreed in a single 
package deal. 
Although the Commission was mandated as chief 
negotiator, the heads of government were not going to 
let go of the reins. Here Article 50 does begin to resemble 
the intergovernmental diplomacy of Article 49 – but 
with the important caveat that “there will be no separate 
negotiations between individual Member States and the 
United Kingdom on matters pertaining to the withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom from the Union”. The EU would 
speak and act with one voice. 
The hybrid nature of EU governance was established – 
Commission and Council working in tandem – but so 
also was the hierarchy between the EU institutions and 
national capitals. Brussels was in charge, and tightly 
organised. The Commission’s Task Force 50 was backed 
up by the Council working group, chaired by Didier 
Seeuws, and supported by the European Parliament Brexit 
steering group under the leadership of Guy Verhofstadt. 
The rotating presidency of the Council of ministers played 
no role. Off-message remarks by ministers in national 
capitals were swiftly slapped down. The most revealing 
moments of EU insider politics were exquisite comments 
dropped to the press by Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude 
Juncker at the close of meetings of the European Council, 
often late at night.
So already, at the outset of the actual Brexit 
negotiations, the EU had established its paramountcy 
in the negotiations and had laid down the scope of the 
Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration  
as well as the rules under which the negotiations  
would be conducted. 
TOUGHENING UP
The European Council issued subsequent guidelines in 
December 2017 and March 2018. The line did not vary 
but the language got tougher, especially as attention 
turned to the nature of the future relationship and 
the May government became entangled in barbed wire 
around its own red lines. In March 2018 the European 
Council warned:
“[T]he European Council has to take into account 
the repeatedly stated positions of the UK, which 
limit the depth of such a future partnership … In 
this context, the European Council reiterates in 
particular that any agreement with the United 
Kingdom will have to be based on a balance of 
rights and obligations, and ensure a level playing 
field. A non-member of the Union, that does not 
live up to the same obligations as a member, 
cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same 
benefits as a member.”18 
The two decisions to extend the deadline 
of the Article 50 process beyond 29 March 
may have been unwise but the European 
Council can hardly be faulted on the 
grounds of inflexibility.
Where the UK has been fickle and disorganised, the EU 
has been firm yet fair. The European Council always 
maintained that if the British adapted their red lines, 
the EU position would be adaptable accordingly. The 
8EU made every effort, short of compromising its core 
principles, to ensure that Brexit takes place within the 
constitutional ambit of the Union, maintaining the  
spirit of sincere cooperation. The EU deferred to 
London’s version of the Irish backstop, keeping the 
whole UK territory in the customs union. The two 
decisions to extend the deadline of the Article 50 
process beyond 29 March may have been unwise  
but the European Council can hardly be faulted on  
the grounds of inflexibility.19 
Brexit has served to propel the EU 
into a period of introspection from 
which it should emerge with a greater 
understanding of what it is to be a  
member state – even as the British  
discover more about what it is not to  
be a member state.
The extent to which Brexit poses a fundamental blow to 
the Union is underestimated in Britain. The departure 
of the UK will leave the EU smaller and poorer, with 
its profile on the world stage undeniably diminished. 
The risk that other European leaders, such as Matteo 
Salvini or Viktor Orban, will play the Cameron card is 
considered a real one. 
The current reflective mood is accentuated by the EU 
having had recourse, for the first time, to the use of 
Article 7 TEU which lays down procedures of discipline 
and penalty in the event that a member state breaches 
the rule of law. The new Commission of Ursula von der 
Leyen will be committed to pursuing Article 7 measures 
against Hungary and Poland, and may well have to open 
comparable proceedings against Bulgaria, Romania  
and Croatia, the newest member state, in light of 
endemic corruption. 
A CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT
Brexit has served to propel the EU into a period of 
introspection from which it should emerge with a greater 
understanding of what it is to be a member state – even 
as the British discover more about what it is not to be 
a member state. This is for the Union an important 
constitutional moment of self-definition. We do not yet 
know whether Article 50 has worked to achieve an orderly 
Brexit. But it is clear that the transparent and disciplined 
way in which Mr Barnier conducted the negotiations on 
behalf of the Commission under the watchful guidance of 
the European Council has paid dividends in terms of the 
EU’s internal unity and cohesion. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that, perversely despite the loss of a major member 
state, the EU is emerging somehow stronger out of the  
Brexit process.20
PART THREE: THE FUTURE
TOWARDS ASSOCIATION
How might that unity survive during the next phase of 
negotiations with Britain? The Lisbon treaty provides 
some useful pointers. Article 8 TEU binds the EU to 
“develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity  
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values  
of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on cooperation”. The EU may conclude 
specific agreements with such neighbours containing 
“reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the 
possibility of undertaking activities jointly”. 
Whether or not there is a deal under the terms of  
Article 50, the EU and the UK will have to sit down without 
delay to discuss their future association. Even a minimal 
free trade agreement will require an EU-UK treaty that 
deals not only with tariffs and non-tariff barriers but also 
with the level playing field. Differing levels of regulatory 
alignment will open different degrees of British access 
to the EU market. Subjects to be covered in any trade 
agreement are bound to include technical regulations 
and standards, state aid, labour and social policy and 
environmental policy. Any more ambitious association 
agreement will require joint governance, surveillance, 
supervision and dispute resolution mechanisms. Again, 
the association options are varied but limited: the choice 
between them has strategic importance. 
 
Whether or not there is a deal under the 
terms of Article 50, the EU and the UK will 
have to sit down without delay to discuss 
their future association.
Within the broad political context of Article 8,  
Mrs May aimed at concluding an ambitious  
association agreement with the EU under the legal  
base of Article 217 TFEU. Ukraine’s association 
agreement of 2014 provides a useful template. 
The partnership – which would embrace a deep 
and comprehensive free trade agreement, political 
cooperation in the security field, and robust 
9arrangements for joint governance – would need  
the unanimous approval of all member states plus the 
assent of the European Parliament.21
Boris Johnson prefers a less close continuing relationship 
with the EU. He wants a “best in class” free trade 
agreement in which the UK would be more loosely 
aligned with EU norms, with consequently reduced access 
to the EU market. Article 207 TFEU provides the legal 
base, and the recent Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) with Canada the obvious template. 
Such a narrow agreement could be decided by qualified 
majority vote in the Council.22
THE NEED FOR BIPARTISANSHIP
The United Kingdom is a deeply divided country. For some 
anti-Europeans, any type of association with the EU post-
Brexit is anathema. Pro-Europeans may find that a formal 
association agreement is acceptable only as a temporary or 
transitional arrangement. Beyond the next general election 
in Britain a more progressive government may take office 
committed to repairing the UK’s broken links with the 
EU. The option of re-accession will one day have to be 
addressed. Speculation (much of it idle) has already started 
about what conditions would be attached by the EU to any 
new accession treaty with Britain. 
The idea that the UK would be welcome to rejoin on 
exactly the same terms as it left is palpable nonsense. 
Other considerations aside, the mistrust induced by 
Brexit is a serious political obstacle to a quick and easy 
membership bid. The EU would want to know that there 
could be no repeat of the Brexit experience. This means 
that any reversal of British European policy has to be 
genuine and durable, and based on a solid bipartisan 
majority at Westminster.  
The option of re-accession will one day 
have to be addressed.
The overly adversarial nature of British politics has 
always prevented the emergence of a broad-based cross-
party consensus on Europe. When a Tory government 
fought to enter the EEC, Labour opposed. When Tony 
Blair edged closer to the EU, the Tory opposition 
objected. The current Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has 
voted against every EU treaty. Indeed, revisions to EU 
treaties have squeaked through the House of Commons 
by negligible majorities constructed only by virtue 
of divisions within the ranks of the Labour and Tory 
parties. Even the more pro-European Liberal Democrats, 
briefly in government, promoted the EU Act 2011 which 
unilaterally imposed UK referendums on all future EU 
treaty amendments. Britain has never been a solidly 
reliable member of the European Union. 
Could the UK be truly converted to the European cause? 
The rest of the EU will certainly be watching closely to 
see if any pro-European swing in British public opinion 
is accompanied by a shake-up of the political system 
at Westminster. Above all, will the Commons at last be 
elected by proportional representation so that seats 
won in the chamber reflect votes cast in the ballot box? 
Electoral reform would certainly see a number of far-
right English nationalist MPs elected, but it would also 
make possible stable coalition government of the liberal 
centre. In short, a system of fair votes would make 
British politics very much more European. On that basis, 
a new application to join the EU would be welcomed.23 
In short, a system of fair votes would make 
British politics very much more European. 
On that basis, a new application to join the 
EU would be welcomed. 
REJOINING UNDER ARTICLE 49
The test of eligibility to launch a successful candidacy 
for EU membership is much tougher than when the 
UK joined the European Community in 1973. In those 
days, accession negotiations concentrated on reducing 
Britain’s Commonwealth preference for agricultural 
goods. Once France’s President Pompidou had heard 
from British Prime Minister Heath that the UK would 
respect the unwritten rule of unanimity in the  
Council (the Luxembourg compromise), the way  
ahead was cleared. 
In today’s much wider and deeper Union there are three 
basic conditions for membership – the Copenhagen 
criteria – which were adopted in 1993 and 1995. For 
accession negotiations to be launched, a country must 
satisfy the first criterion; to be concluded, all three.
The first criterion demands that the candidate state 
enjoys stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. A UK engaged in constitutional 
reform should have no difficulty here. The second 
requirement is to possess a functioning market  
economy capable of withstanding the competitive 
pressure and market forces of the European Union. 
Again, no problem for the UK.
The third criterion, however, insists on the incomer’s 
ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including the capacity to implement effectively the 
rules, standards and policies that make up the body 
of EU law (the acquis), and to adhere to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. Its inability to 
meet these demands is why the UK is no longer a viable 
member state. 
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Once a state is accepted as a candidate, the Commission 
presents 35 sectoral chapters, all of which have to be 
opened and closed. The only real ‘negotiation’ comes 
towards the end of the enlargement process and weighs 
on budgetary matters. As with Article 50, so with Article 
49: the EU side is dominant. One significant difference 
to procedure is that while Article 50 is concluded by 
a QMV decision of the Council, Article 49 requires an 
inter-state treaty agreed by unanimity and ratification in 
all member states.  
Its inability to meet these demands is why 
the UK is no longer a viable member state.
It is fanciful to think that the UK could simply re-
engage as a member state on its previous terms. The 
fudgy compromises that pepper the UK’s current terms 
of membership will no longer apply. Indeed, Britain’s 
opt-outs will be defunct along with the rest of its 
membership obligations on 31 October. Protocol No 15, 
the UK opt-out from the euro, and Protocol No 21, the 
UK reservations on justice and home affairs, will be null 
and void. The infamous British budget rebate is already 
jettisoned in the negotiations among the EU 27 on the 
new multi-annual financial framework that will apply 
from 2021. 
A REFORMED EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union the UK would be applying to rejoin 
will not be the same EU as it is leaving in 2019. We 
have seen how the Brexit episode has already served 
to strengthen the state-like qualities of the Union and 
to sharpen its self-identity. Brexit has clarified what 
membership means. 
The political agenda of Commission President-elect 
von der Leyen suggests that further constitutional 
reform of the Union is once again realisable. In this, 
she will be helped by Charles Michel, the new President 
of the European Council. A more federal union 
beckons, and with it the probability that the EU will 
be imaginative about developing a series of dynamic 
association agreements with its neighbours designed 
to foster cooperation, manage conflicts and encourage 
convergence.24
It is even possible that the next treaty revision installs 
a new class of associate membership expressly in order 
to accommodate privileged partners of the Union, 
committed to the first two Copenhagen criteria but not 
the third.25
In any case, if a reformed EU works well it will be a more 
attractive proposition for the UK: it will also be better 
equipped to deal with British exceptionalism. Britain 
returning would be a vote of confidence in the European 
project. But there should be no doubt that when faced 
with the British application, the future EU can be 
expected to be especially vigilant about its capacity 
to maintain the momentum of future integration 
with Britain back as a full member. As and when these 
matters are negotiated, the manner of Britain’s leaving 
the Union, which has still to be finally determined, will 
surely be remembered.  
A more federal union beckons, and with 
it the probability that the EU will be 
imaginative about developing a series  
of dynamic association agreements  
with its neighbours designed to foster 
cooperation, manage conflicts and 
encourage convergence. 
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